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May 2009
MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS

Exactions or Extortions?
Roger Bernhardt and David Callies
Building Industry Ass’n v City of Patterson
The decision in Building Industry Ass’n v City of Patterson, reported at p 78, may well have
become unpublished by the time this column appears, since it clearly is unfriendly to those
activists seeking to improve the affordable housing stock in their communities. But the mere fact
that a unanimous panel of a court of appeal found the logic behind those efforts to be
(constitutionally?) wanting is noteworthy, even if the opinion ceases to have an official existence.
To get an outside perspective on those efforts, which are often centered in California, I turned
to David L. Callies, the Kudo Professor of Law at the University of Hawaii’s William S.
Richardson School of Law, whose writings on these issues have always impressed me. Given his
credentials (see p 66), it made more sense for me to ask the questions and have him give the
answers.—RB
RB: David, technically, this decision purports to hold only that the city’s interpretation of a
development agreement it executed with one developer is incorrect, but I read it to say that its
entire affordable housing impact fee—whether imposed by way of a development agreement or
an across-the-board ordinance—will not pass constitutional muster. What is your
interpretation?
DC: The latter. Moreover, it seems to me the reasoning of the case applies not only to housing
set-asides/fees/exactions, but all land development conditions/in lieu/mitigation fees. Although
Nollan/Dolan intermediate scrutiny may not apply, the court is clearly requiring some
demonstrable connection between a problem caused by the development/developer and the
fee/set-aside.
RB: But what about the notion that across-the-board, wide-ranging impositions, especially
those legislatively enacted, should survive judicial scrutiny more successfully than
individualized, adjudicative decisions that come out of appointees in agencies?
DC: True, according to the California Supreme Court in Ehrlich v Culver City (1996) 12 C4th
854, 50 CR2d 242, though I admit to the same puzzlement as Justice Thomas in his dissent from
the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of Georgia v City of Atlanta
(1995) 515 US 1116, 1117, 132 L Ed 2d 273, 274, 115 S Ct 2268: Certainly, legislative bodies
can impose conditions that are just as unconstitutional as those imposed by administrative
agencies. The rest of the California Supreme Court’s Ehrlich decision is a stark example of what
results from the mindless application of legislative deference: upholding the levying of a public
art fee on the developer of a small condominium complex, without any attempt to link that

development with a presumably public desire for public art. How does any private development
even remotely drive a need for art?
RB: Getting to the formula itself, the Patterson opinion requires that the city demonstrate a
“reasonable relationship between the amount of the fee, as increased,” and the “deleterious
public impact of the development.”-As to the overall size of the fee, what do you think of a
formula that calculates an affordable housing fee by starting with the county’s regional housing
need calculation of 642 affordable housing units, estimating each one of them to require a
subsidy of $55,000-$165,000, and then dividing that total subsidy cost ($73.5 million) among the
3500 unbuilt units in the town, so as to reach a fee of $21,000 on each new building permit? Do
you think that will ever be upheld as a legitimate way to start?
DC: We don’t get to proportionality if there is no nexus. However, even if one gets past nexus,
the suggested calculation above places the entire burden for affordable housing on new
development—which, I suspect, will not pass even a watered-down version of a proportionality
test. Thus, for example, why should all unbuilt units pay an identical impact fee? Why shouldn’t
the city pay a substantial portion of the cost of affordable housing, once the fee has been
separated from the need for lack of nexus? Note that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was
impressed by the City of Sacramento’s willingness to pay half the cost of the affordable housing
need generated by the proposed hotel (according to the city’s studies) in Commercial Builders of
N. Cal. v City of Sacramento (9th Cir 1991) 941 F2d 872.
RB: So are you saying that you think a court (or this court) is saying that there is no nexus, or
that step 2 makes no sense without a step 1?
DC: The latter. The court found no demonstrable relationship between the housing fee and the
public impact of the contemplated/proposed residential development. Therefore, considering
proportionality—the size of the fee—in this circumstance is moot.
RB: As to the components of the formula, how does a community justifiably estimate its need
for affordable housing? Can it just accept the number given to it by its county or regional
government agency? If there is no such higher authority to get a number from, how would a city
calculate its own number? Would it have to make a census of its residents and then derive the
shortfall mathematically by comparing the median income of its residents with the median cost of
its housing? Given the emphasis on regional housing needs, wouldn’t the city also have to look
at the economic situation of the outsiders who might like to move into town but cannot afford to
do so?
DC: The issue is not the community’s need, but the legality/constitutionality of the mechanism
that it chooses to use to attempt to meet that need. Extracting (some would say extorting) the
housing necessary to satisfy that need from a housing provider of more expensive housing is a
tax, pure and simple: It is a means of raising revenue or its equivalent. Impact fees, exactions,
and dedications, on the other hand, represent exercises of the police power, not the power to tax
and raise revenues. The city is entitled to meet those “needs” through land development fees and
exactions only if those “needs” are generated by the proposed development. If the development
is commercial, then depending on the nature of that commercial use, the Ninth Circuit’s City of
Sacramento decision methodology would be apt: Do a study that determines the number of lowincome employment opportunities generated by the development and the shortage of available
affordable housing to meet that development-generated need, and then assess the commercial
development a share of the cost incurred to meet that need.

RB: How does a community that makes some of its housing affordable allocate that benefit? If
it can’t reduce the cost across the board for everybody, how does it decide who the winners are?
Are lotteries or waiting lists better? Can only residents get on the list?
DC:-The mechanism simply needs to be fair; going beyond residents, however, abandons any
pretense of justification based on community need. Since community need is the only basis for
levying such a fee in the first place, only residents should be counted in determining that need.
Lotteries are pretty random methods for determining who is entitled to a limited amount of
affordable housing. Better to use waiting lists with each resident’s position on it based upon a
combination of factors like current income and family size.
RB: Another case that is reported in this issue—Alfaro v Community Hous. (reported at p
81)—deals with whether affordability covenants can run with the land and restrict the
subsequent profits that could otherwise be made by resales by the winners of the affordability
sweepstakes. Do you think the inclusion of such features has anything to do with the validity of
the ordinance that imposes the fee on a developer?
DC: I don’t see much connection between the covenant and the initial fee, except to observe
that if the owner of an affordable unit is going to make a profit of some kind, then (a) the
likelihood of a successful 14th Amendment challenge increases for failure to advance a
legitimate state interest and (b) the California cases dealing with mobilehomes/parks and
“placement value” (such as the January 2008 MHC Financing Ltd. v San Rafael federal district
court findings of fact and conclusions of law and the April 2009 order for entry of judgment in
the same case) probably become relevant. In both, the court held the leaving of a transfer
premium—placement value—resulting from a municipal rent control ordinance with a
mobilehome pad lessee constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property from the mobilehome
park owner-lessor, which becomes relevant for just such a regulatory taking theory. The case
number on the latter order is C 00–375 VRW, issued April 17, 2009; the former ruling was
issued on January 29, 2008.
RB: The great issue for me is: How can a city show “the deleterious public impact” on a
housing development in terms of creating a need for affordable housing? One can see the
linkage between the industrial or commercial development and affordable housing, but where is
the nexus when the new development is residential instead? Is it that the new middle-class
homeowners moving in need to have their domestics not commuting from too far away? If that is
so, wouldn’t that be solved more easily by permitting larger houses and servants’ quarters?
DC: That’s the point:-The city can’t show a deleterious impact on affordable housing resulting
from a residential development.-There isn’t any. I think these mechanisms won’t hold up in court
anywhere, and following the Patterson decision and the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (2005) 544 US 528, 161 L Ed 2d 876, 125 S Ct 2074, I don’t think they’re
constitutional in California either.
RB: Will these issues be any easier if the formula is changed? Will an inclusionary zoning
ordinance—one that requires the developer to set aside of some percentage of units for low or
moderate income housing—survive the Patterson standard, or will that type fail as well?
DC: Inclusionary zoning in the context you suggest is both illusory and misplaced.-The
concept was originally used against recalcitrant local governments (as in the New Jersey Mt.
Laurel litigation (South Burlington County NAACP v Mount Laurel (NJ 1975) 336 A2d 713))

that failed to provide for a fair share of affordable housing by, among other things, zoning only
for middle to high-end housing.-To turn it on its head and apply it to a landowner developer is
flawed from the beginning.
RB: Could the requirement be written as a tax instead? Say, an excise tax on the privilege of
developing land? That might require a supermajority voter approval in California (because of
Proposition 13), but might nevertheless be politically possible because the residents—who are
the voters—already live in completed houses that would not be subject to the tax, leaving only
the owners of undeveloped land to bear its burden.
DC: Sure, a tax would solve all the legal problems.-It recognizes such housing exactions for
what they are: revenue-raising measures (as opposed to police power exercises) with no
connection to the residential project to which they are applied.
RB: So?
DC: In sum, the Patterson case requires some reasonable connection between a land
development fee or exaction of any kind and a need that the “charged” developer causes by
reason of its development. Gone are the days when a California local government could require
the payment of such fees and exactions simply because local government had a need and the
developer needed a development permit. Certainly, this is a fair result. No one is quarrelling with
the public need. The issue is—and always has been—who pays, and on what basis.
“In lieu” fees, not based on costs attributable to development for which assessed, are not
reasonably justified as required by development agreement.
Building Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal. v City of Patterson (Mar. 2, 2009, F054785) 2009 Cal App
Lexis 399
A developer entered into a development agreement with the City of Patterson and obtained
tentative subdivision maps for the construction of two subdivisions within the city. The
development agreement provided for a fee of $734 per house in lieu of building affordable
housing. The development agreement acknowledged that the city was revising its analysis of the
affordable housing fee and included the developer’s agreement to a revised in lieu fee schedule,
“providing the same is reasonably justified.” Three years later, after the city increased that fee to
over $20,000 per house, the developer sued, alleging violation of vested property rights, the
terms of the development agreement, and other statutory and constitutional provisions. The trial
court found that the increased fee was permitted under the agreement and was reasonably
justified. The court of appeal reversed.
The original fee was based on the “leverage” analysis approach, which assumed that state and
federal funding would provide 91 percent of the amount needed to build each house. The
increased fee was based on “bridging the affordability gap” between the cost of a market rate
housing unit and the cost of units affordable by very low, low, and moderate income
homebuyers, respectively, multiplied by the number of units needed for each category. The
number of units needed was based on the city’s “Regional Housing Needs Assessment” target.
The total fee was then spread over the number of unentitled units, suggested by data available
from the city’s Department of Finance, in the city’s general plan area.
The court of appeal decided that the pivotal question was whether, under the development
agreement, the fee was “reasonably justified.” “Legislatively imposed development mitigation
fees ... must bear a reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the deleterious

public impact of the development.” San Remo Hotel v City & County of San Francisco (2002) 27
C4th 643, 671, 117 CR2d 269. Similarly, such fees are not “special taxes” if the amount bears a
reasonable relation to probable costs to the community and benefits to the developer. See
Sinclair Paint Co. v State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 15 C4th 866, 875, 64 CR2d 447. The
evidence showed no connection between the city’s determination of a need for 642 units of
affordable housing “and the need for affordable housing associated with new market rate
development” attributable to the housing in the developer’s two subdivisions or the estimated
total of unentitled lots in the city’s general plan area. No evidence supported a finding that the
fees to be borne by the developer’s project were based on costs attributable to that project. The
issue of an appropriate remedy was remanded to the superior court.

